

SEMINAR NOTICE

Topic: *Buying Support at the UNFCCC: The Strategic Use of Climate Aid*

Speaker: **Professor Katharina Michaelowa, University of Zurich**

Date & time: Friday, February 03, 2017 at 3.30 p.m.

Venue: A.M. Khusro Room, Institute of Economic Growth,
University of Delhi Enclave, North Campus, Delhi - 110 007

Chair: Prof. Purnamita Dasgupta, Institute of Economic Growth

All are welcome.

(Sabyasachi Kar)
Seminar Convenor

Abstract:

The relationship between aid and voting in the UN agencies has been well documented in the aid literature. However, we are not aware of any study that extends the analysis to the wider field of international negotiations, outside the sphere of formal voting. This article thus studies the strategic use of aid in the context of global environmental politics, a field in which decisions are mostly taken by consensus. A novel dataset on negotiation behavior under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change allows us to assess statements of support and opposition towards other parties' positions, rather than voting. On this basis, we identify the role of aid as a strategic tool in a country's negotiation strategy. Is increased aid related to greater support and less opposition? If so, is this any aid, or only such funding that is directly related to the area under negotiation? We apply linear and instrumental variable regressions on a three-dimensional panel dataset with donor-recipient dyads for the period 2002-2013, using a measure of negotiation support as our dependent variable and total, mitigation or adaptation aid as alternative explanatory variables. We find that aid can indeed buy support in the climate negotiations, but that this opportunity is limited to mitigation and adaptation aid, rather than general aid. We argue that this is due to both greater demand for and greater supply of these specific types of aid, whose allocation is under the direct responsibility of the specialized delegates participating in the negotiations. However, we find that this negotiation strategy is rather expensive as aid flows have to be substantial to trigger any sizeable effect on negotiation support

